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NOTES AND COMMENTS
TIE NEGLIGENT NURSE: Rx FOR THE
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE VICTIM
INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, physicians and hospitals have borne the brunt of
medical malpractice liability.1 Increasingly, however, greater attention
is being focused on nurses as a potential additional source of recovery
in cases of negligent medical care.2 In examining this area of negli-
gence law, this comment has three objectives: (1) to review the
development of nurses' malpractice and its relationship to the general
category of medical malpractice; (2) to explore the distinctive aspects
extant in nurses' malpractice; and (3) to analyze the implications of
the trend toward increased inclusion of nurses in malpractice actions.
To examine and fully understand the extent of a nurse's malprac-
tice liability, it is necessary to recognize that nurses' malpractice is
simply a separate branch of medical malpractice, which, in turn, is a
specialized section of general negligence law.3 To prove a prima facie
case of medical malpractice, a plaintiff must (1) introduce evidence
that establishes both the existence of a duty owed him by the medical
practitioner involved and the standard of care applicable to the situa-
tion, (2) demonstrate a failure to meet this duty and the existence of
1. In 1970, 49.4% of the malpractice claims brought named physicians as defend-
ants, 36.2% named hospitals, and only 0.7% named nurses. APPENDIX TO THE REPORT
OF THE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACrICE, DHEW PuB. No. (OS)
73-89, at 19 (1973) [hereinafter cited as A-HEW]. In reference to doctor's malpractice,
see generally M. KIMMEL, LEGAL REMEDiEs FOR MEDICAL EROns (2d ed. 1970); C.
KRAmER, MEDiCAL MALPRACnCE (rev. ed. 1965); C. KRAMER, THE NEGUENT DoCToR
(1968).
2. H. Creighton, The Malpractice Problem, 9 THE NuRsiNo CLNiC ov NORTH
Aim.nucA 425 (1974). Creighton notes that the number of malpractice cases brought
against nurses is on the increase. Id. at 431.
3. See generally Annot., 51 A.L.R.2d 970 (1957); MuRcIRSON & NIcHoLs, LEGAL
FOUNDATIONS OF NuRsiNG PRAcncE (1970).
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a resulting injury and (3) show that the violation was the proximate
cause of the injury complained of.4  In this determination of negli-
gence, a nurse essentially is treated in the same manner as a physician;5
however, subjecting nurses to liability raises an additional problem not
common to doctor's malpractice. Because of the nature of her duties,
a nurse's negligence, under agency principles, may be imputed to either
the physician or surgeon in charge, the hospital employing the nurse,
or to both or neither. 6
DETERMNING THE DuTy ANi STANDARD OF CARE
It is obvious that nurses and other medical personnel who
undertake the obligation to treat patients have a duty to do so within
the parameters of a reasonable standard of care. Establishing the
existence of this duty to patients poses no problem since a duty exists
in every case, either contractually or gratuitously.7 The difficulty arises
in determining the extent of the duty owed to the patient by the nurse
or physician and the standard of care applicable in a particular factual
situation." Varying approaches have been utilized in attempting to
establish and consistently apply a standard to determine whether or
not conduct in a particular case may be adjudged negligent.
One approach which has developed for establishing the duty ele-
ment and the applicable standard of care is the use of a contract theory.
This view was embraced by the Oregon Supreme Court in Giusti v.
C.H. Weston Co.,9 an action brought against a hospital for the misdiag-
nosis of an injury by its employee-physician. The court found that a
contract is implied by law when a hospital undertakes the treatment
of a patient with the motive of making a profit.10 Through this implied
contract, the court concluded that the hospital was compelled to meet
the standard of treating the patient "carefully and skillfully.""1 If the
attendant does not meet this standard, the employer is liable for breach
of the implied contract of skillful treatment. Nurses, the most com-
4. Kosberg v. Washington Hosp. Center, Inc., 394 F.2d 947 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
5. See note 76 infra and accompanying text.
6. See notes 83-92 infra and accompanying text.
7. Griffin v. Colusa Co., 44 Cal. App. 2d 915, 113 P.2d 270 (1941).
8. Ordinarily, a health care practitioner owes a duty of reasonable care to the pa-
tients he treats. What is reasonable depends on the factual situation involved. For
example, under the Good Samaritan statutes, a nurse has only the duty to refrain from
gross negligence. See generally Annot., 39 A.L.R.3d 222 (1971).
9. 165 Or. 525, 108 P.2d 1010 (1941).
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monly employed hospital attendants, 2 are bound under Giusti to treat
paying patients according to the "terms" of the implied contract be-
tween the hospital and the patient.
The Giusti approach has inherent limitations and would raise
serious conceptual problems on two grounds if applied generally to all
nursing malpractice actions. First, because of its language expressly
restricting the contract theory of liability only to hospitals run for profit,
Giusti seems to provide complete protection from liability for employ-
ees of charitable or non-profit hospitals, no matter how careless or
negligent their acts.13  Secondly, Giusti raises the specter of contract
requirements supplanting general negligence law in determining liabil-
ity for a medical error. An implied contract arises by operation of law
when two parties enter into a relationship which is characterized by
expectations of mutual obligations. When one party fails to perform,
the law holds him liable for breach of the implied contract. While this
concept has great utility in commercial settings, it is of dubious value
in a malpractice case. This contractual method of delineating the
standard of care applicable in a particular case unnecessarily compli-
cates the process of establishing malpractice liability because, in effect,
it relegates the malpractice issue to a secondary position while the con-
tract aspects of the suit are litigated. While the effect of this contrac-
tual process is somewhat similar to the type of analysis ordinarily
utilized in negligence cases, it nonetheless represents an unnecessary
step in deciding whether medical treatment rendered meets the stand-
ard of care required.
A somewhat analogous approach to Giusti was taken by the
Supreme Court of Virginia in Stuart Circle Hospital Corp. v. Curry.14
However, the court did not attempt to rely upon an expressly stated
contract theory to resolve the duty and standard of care issues:
The basis of the liability [is] the undertaking of the
hospital to furnish competent hospitalization; and the fact
that the patient, having entrusted himself to the hospital for
treatment, [has] the right to expect from it and its employees,
while under its care, ordinary care and skill in nursing and
12. In 1972, of the 780,000 registered nurses in the United States, 66% were em-
ployed by hospitals. Of the 427,000 licensed practical nurses, 617o were employed by
hospitals. DHEW PuB. No. (HRA) 75-4B, at 61 (1974).
13. If the standard of care is dependent on a contract, and the contract is dependent
on the hospital being run for profit, it logically follows that without a contract there
is no duty, and if there is no duty, there can be no liability.
14. 173 Va. 136, 3 S.E.2d 153 (1939).
[Vol. 12:104
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treatment in such a degree of diligence as the nature of his
case required.15
Although not expressly stated, the court's suggestion is that some clear,
albeit unexpressed, agreement exists between the patient and the hos-
pital that the patient shall receive proper treatment because of his
unique, transitory relationship with the hospital. While this view shares
some similarities with the Giusti analysis, it also represents a more
flexible approach to the standard of care problem; there is neither the
rigidity of the contract approach nor any suggestion of concrete distinc-
tions between profit-motivated hospitals and charitable institutions.
However, Curry falls short in developing a clear standard of care: the
thrust of the court's effort is directed more at establishing the duty ele-
ment than resolving the issue of how to determine the applicable stand-
ard of care.
A number of courts have attempted to avoid this issue, focusing
instead on establishing a general standard by which actions in a par-
ticular case may be judged. The elusive "ordinary care" concept has
been frequently used by courts in making this evaluation; a typical judi-
cial example is provided in South Highlands Infirmary v. Galloway.16
In an action to recover damages suffered as a result of a fall from his
bed following an operation, the patient alleged negligence on the part
of the nurse in leaving him unattended while he was in a weakened
post-operative condition. The court, trying to settle the negligence
issue, devoted its attention to the standard of care determination:
Broadly speaking, ordinary care, that care which persons of
common prudence exercise under like conditions, is the degree
of care recognized by courts throughout the country. This
implies a care having regard to the conditions of the particular
case, and to the fact that the subjects of ministry are sick
people. It implies an obligation to have such training and
possess such skill as will enable the nurse to give reasonable
and ordinary care to the patient. 7
Courts following this view of the degree of care required simply
adapt the standard of the reasonably prudent man in the ordinary negli-
gence case to medical malpractice. Essentially, the analysis outlined in
15. Id. at -, 3 S.E.2d at 158. But see Stone v. Sisters of Charity of House of
Providence, 2 Wash. App. 607, -, 469 P.2d 229, 233 (1970), indicating that a nurse
must only "exercise reasonable care to see that no unnecessary harm comes to her pa-
tient."
16. 233 Ala. 276, 171 So. 250 (1936).
17. Id. at--, 171 So. 2d at 253.
1976]
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South Highlands and followed by other courts' 8 suggests the develop-
ment of a "reasonably prudent nurse" standard, applying an ordinary
care concept. While this standard provides a more specific focus for
measuring the nurse's conduct, it does not indicate whether "the
reasonably prudent nurse" is a general standard or one more specifi-
cally developed by a consideration of the level of nursing competence
and particular practices in the locality where the alleged act of negli-
gence occurred.
A Louisiana appellate court has attempted to clarify this ambiguity.
In Norton v. Argonaut Insurance Co.,19 the court inferred that nurses
are governed by the same rules that establish the duty and standard
of care for physicians. Since Louisiana follows the "locality rule" for
determining physicians' malpractice liability,20 the court concluded the
same rule should apply for nurses. Norton seems to resolve the
ambiguities implicit in South Highlands. It assumes that because
doctors and nurses are both members of the medical profession they
should be held to the same high standard of professional competence.
However, by the use of Norton's sweeping dicta, courts can make this
standard impossible to rationally apply. This was aptly demonstrated
in the subsequent case of Thompson v. Brent,21 another Louisiana deci-
sion, arising after a nurse severely cut a patient's arm while attempting
to remove a cast. In attempting to apply the Norton standard, the court
concluded that nurses should be held to the same standard of care
as physicians; therefore, it sought to apply the standard which would
be applied had the doctor himself performed the procedure. 2 The
problem is apparent. While in Brent the physician-standard made
no difference in the outcome, since the nurse was negligent under any
standard, situations could arise in which a doctor would be considered
18. See Birmingham Infirmary v. Coe, 206 Ala. 687, 91 So. 604 (1921); Timbrell
v. Suburban Hosp., Inc., - Cal. App. -, 36 P.2d 435 (1934); Duke Sanitarium v.
Hearn, 159 Okla. 1, 13 P.2d 183 (1932).
19. 144 So. 2d 249 (La. App. 1962).
20. The locality rule holds a physician to the
duty to exercise the degree of skill ordinarily employed, under similar circum-
stances, by the members of his profession in good standing in the same
community or locality, and to use reasonable care and diligence, along with
his best judgment, in the application of his skill to the case.
Myer v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 225 La. 618, -, 73 So. 2d 781, 782 (1953)
(emphasis added).
21. 245 So. 2d 751 (La. App. 1971).
22. Id. at 753. In this case, it would be proper to expect the same standard of
care from the nurse as from the doctor. Certain tasks, such as the removal of casts
or surgical dressings, may be performed by either a doctor or a nurse. In such a case,
the same standard of care should be applied.
[Vol. 12:104
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negligent in his performance of some task where he failed to act to the
best of his ability as a physician, while a nurse, performing the same
task in the same manner, could be acting to the best of her ability as a
nurse.
Because of this potential for inequitable application, the court in
Thompson v. United States23 rejected the Brent analysis of Norton.
Instead, it found that Norton clearly held nurses to the standard of skill
found in members of the nursing profession in the same community,
rather than to the standard for physicians.2" Thompson, in effect,
adopted for nurses the standard required of physicians, substituting
"nurse" for "physician" and "nursing profession" for "medical profes-
sion." 25  This standard enables a court to determine negligence on the
basis of what is expected from a member of the nursing profession in
her community, rather than holding her to the high standard required
of a physician. While this is a rather simple exercise in semantics, it
does eliminate all possible areas of confusion. Moreover, it is more
definite than the contract theory, more likely to be evenly applied than
the reasonably prudent nurse standard, and not subject to the misinter-
pretation of the physician's standard as exemplified in Brent.
An even further refinement of this standard, illustrating its
inherent utility, is reflected in Baur v. Mesta Machine Co.,26 a case
involving the alleged negligence of a nurse in an industrial dispensary.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted, as the standard for a nurse,
the standard of care required of a physician, but modified it to apply
exactly to the case at hand. While the court said the standard appli-
cable to registered nurses was that of "a reasonably prudent registered
nurse in charge of an industrial dispensary," 27 it seems obvious that it
did not mean to hold all nurses in all situations to the standard required
23. 368 F. Supp. 466 (W.D. La. 1973).
24. Id. at 468. Unfortunately, Norton, itself, did not clearly hold anything. The
court, in establishing its standard of care, found:
The same rules that govern the duty and liability of physicians and surgeons
in the performance of professional services are applicable to practitioners of
the kindred branches of the healing profession, such as dentists, and, likewise
are applicable to practitioners such as drugless healers, oculists, and manipu-
lators of X-ray machines and other machines or devices.
144 So. 2d at 260. See also 70 C.J.S. 946. What is clear is headnote number 4 in
Norton: "Generally, nurses must exercise degree of skill ordinarily employed under
similar circumstances by members of their profession in good standing in same com-
munity or locality.. . ." 144 So. 2d at 249. Thus, the Brent holding relied heavily
on a headnote which had little, if any, grounding in the Norton opinion itself.
25. 368 F. Supp. at 468.
26. 405 Pa. 617, 176 A.2d 684 (1961).
27. Id. at -, 176 A.2d at 688.
19761
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in an industrial dispensary. In future cases, the court would drop "in-
dustrial dispensary" and substitute the place where the defendant nurse
was working at the time of the alleged malpractice. The problem of
what a reasonably prudent nurse would do could be solved on the basis
of expert testimony concerning the usual practice in the particular type of
nursing involved in the suit. As a result, the Baur approach can be
flexibly utilized in almost any case involving a nurse's alleged mal-
practice.
The most precise standard of care is that which holds a nurse to
the degree of skill ordinarily exercised by members of the nursing pro-
fession performing the same function in the same general community.
It presents a workable standard which can be readily applied to any
situation. Moreover, it is no less restrictive than any of the more com-
plex standards in delineating negligent acts. Because it is easier to
prove whether this standard has been violated, it presents a more
realistic approach to the question of the standard of care owed by a
nurse to her patients.
FAILmRE TO MEET THE STANDARD IMPOSED
Assuming the other elements of a negligence action are present,
whenever a nurse breaches the standard of care owed to a patient,
either through an affirmative act or an omission, she is negligent.2 8
Traditionally, breaches have occurred in a number of specific areas of
nursing practice. By examining the spectrum of nurses' malpractice
cases, six broad categories can be established in which liability exposure
is customarily greatest for the nurse: (1) foreign objects inadvertently
and negligently left in a patient during an operation; (2) improper use
of equipment; (3) improper exercise of a physical nursing skill; (4)
the preparation and/or administration of an improper medication or
other solution; (5) improper diagnosis; and (6) following the physi-
cian's orders.
Foreign Objects
A frequent source of malpractice actions against doctors results
from foreign objects left in a patient during surgery. 29 Because of the
28. Moore v. Guthrie Hosp., Inc., 403 F.2d 366 (4th Cir. 1968); Kosberg v. Wash-
ington Hosp. Center, Inc., 394 F.2d 947 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
29. A study conducted by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare indi-
cated that between 25% and 29% of the cases of alleged malpractice result from surgi-
cal material being left in the patient's body. See A-HEW, supra note 1, at 163.
110 [Vol. 12:104
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role a nurse ordinarily plays in an operation, she also can be guilty of
negligence in such instances. In an operation, it is not uncommon for
the surgeon to use literally hundreds of instruments and spongesf 0 It
requires a person of unusual mental proficiency to accurately monitor
the location of each individual object while concentrating on the actual
operating procedure and the patient's fluctuating physical condition.
Hence, a necessary member of the surgical team is a nurse who counts
every device going into and coming out of the patient at the site of the
surgical procedure.81 Her duty, as a reasonably prudent nurse exercis-
ing that degree of skill common to her profession in the community,
is to count properly. If the total number of items coming out does not
equal the number of items that went in, and she fails to so inform
the surgeon in charge, she has breached her duty and is negligent.32
In a complex operation, the chief surgeon is assisted by a number
of other surgeons. Each surgeon is assigned a nurse to hand him the
required instruments. In such cases, it is common for one nurse to
count every item given to the scrub nurses, and for another nurse to
count every item coming out of the patient.3 3 Each nurse reports her
count to the circulating nurse,34 whose responsibility is to report any
discrepancy to the chief surgeon. If the nurse monitoring the number
of items leaving the body fails to count properly, she is negligent. On
the other hand, if she counts correctly, but the circulating nurse does
not report any discrepancy between this figure and the count of the
items going in, the circulating nurse, rather than the counting nurse,
is negligent.3 5
As a general rule, a surgeon's failure to remove a sponge or other
device raises a rebuttable presumption of negligence on his part.36 The
30. See generally L. BRUNNER, C. EMERSON, L. FERGUSON, & D. SUDDARTH, TEXT-
BOOK OF MEDICAL SURGICAL NURSING, 989-1009 (2d ed. 1970).
31. This information was obtained in an interview with several registered nurses,
employed by Tulsa, Oklahoma hospitals. [Hereinafter cited as Interview].
32. See Buzan v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 203 So. 2d 11 (Fla. App. 1967); Grant v.
Touro Infirmary, 254 La. 204, 223 So. 2d 148 (1969); Martin v. Perth Amboy Gen'l
Hosp., 104 N.J. Super. 335, 250 A.2d 40 (App. Div. 1969); Harle v. Krchnak, 422
S.W.2d 810 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
33. Interview, supra note 31.
34. Because of the limited amount of space available in close proximity to the pa-
tient, and the number of instruments involved, it is not uncommon for the nurses who
do the counting to be at opposite ends of the operating room, making direct communi-
cation between them difficult, if not impossible. In addition to her other responsibilities,
the circulating nurse will receive the counts from the respective nurses and determine
whether or not there is a discrepancy. Interview, supra note 31.
35. Piper v. Epstein, 326 IMI. App. 400, 62 N.E.2d 139 (1945).
36. In some circumstances, the condition of the patient may call for the conscious
1976]
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nurse who negligently makes an improper count usually will be jointly
liable with the doctor.8 7 Some courts, however, allow a surgeon to rely
on the count made by the nurse. If the nurse makes an improper count
and the surgeon relies on that count, he may be absolved of responsi-
bility and insulated from malpractice liability."8 This is of crucial
importance to the nurse, since civil actions may be permitted against
her alone, without other defendants with whom to share an adverse
judgment. While medical malpractice suits against nurses alone are
uncommon today, the general rule remains that a nurse who makes an
improper count which results in an item being left in the patient is
negligent, regardless of whether that negligence may be imputed to
or shared by any other defendants.
Improper Use of Equipment
It is readily apparent that a prudent nurse should properly use
equipment furnished her in the manner in which its use is intended.
If the hospital furnishes obsolete equipment which is dangerous if used,
as compared with more modem equipment, the nurse has a duty to
refrain from using it, unless the patient's condition is such that the delay
in treatment would cause more harm to the patient than the use of the
obsolete equipment might produce.3 9
medical decision by the surgeon to leave a foreign object in the patient. If this decision
is reasonable, there is no negligence. Thus, a defendant doctor has the chance of rebut-
ting the presumption of negligence.
A nurse, on the other hand, is not considered to have the ability to make such
a decision. Thus, the presumption of negligence raised as to her act is not rebuttable.
See Spears v. McKinnon, 168 Ark. 357, 270 S.W. 524 (1925); Ales v. Ryan, 8 Cal.
2d 82, 64 P.2d 409 (1936); Key v. Caldwell, 39 Cal. App. 2d 698, 104 P.2d 87 (1940);
Armstrong v. Wallace, 8 Cal. App. 2d 429, 47 P.2d 740 (1935); Smith v. Zeagler, 116
Fla. 628, 157 So. 328 (1934); Buzan v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 203 So. 2d 11 (Fla. App.
1967); Funk v. Bonham, 204 Ind. 170, 183 N.E. 312 (1932); Rule v. Cheeseman, 181
Kan. 957, 317 P.2d 472 (1957); Barnett's Adm'r v. Brand, 165 Ky. 616, 177 S.W. 461
(1915); Grant v. Touro Infirmary, 254 La. 204, 223 So. 2d 148 (1969); Winchester
v. Chabut, 321 Mich. 114, 32 N.W.2d 358 (1948); Walker v. Holbrook, 130 Minn.
106, 153 N.W. 305 (1915); Stawicki v. Kelly, 113 N.J.L 551, 174 A. 896 (1934),
afl'd, 115 N.J.L. 190, 178 A. 754 (1935); Ault v. Hall, 119 Ohio St. 422, 164 N.E.
518 (1928); Palmer v. Humiston, 87 Ohio St. 401, 101 N.E. 283 (1913); Davis v.
Kerr, 239 Pa. 351, 86 A. 1007 (1913); French v. Fischer, 50 Tenn. App. 587, 362
S.W.2d 926 (1962); McCormick v. Jones, 152 Wash. 508, 278 P. 181 (1929); Paro
v. Carter, 177 Wis. 121, 188 N.W. 68 (1922); Jackson v. Hansard, 45 Wyo. 201, 17
P.2d 659 (1933).
37. Buzan v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 203 So. 2d 11 (Fla. App. 1967); Piper v. Epstein,
326 Ill. App. 400, 62 N.E.2d 1139 (1945); Grant v. Touro Infirmary, 254 La. 204,
223 So. 2d 148 (1969); Martin v. Perth Amboy Gen'l Hosp., 104 N.J. Super. 335, 250
A.2d 40 (App. Div. 1969); Harle v. Krchnak, 422 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
38. Robinson v. St. John's Med. Center, 508 S.W.2d 7 (Mo. App. 1974).




Menges: The Negligent Nurse: Rx for the Medical Malpractice Victim
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2013
1976] NURSES' MALPRACTICE
A nurse is not responsible for an injury resulting from the failure
of equipment, unless the item is obviously unfit for its intended pur-
pose. A nurse is not required to delve into the inner workings of the
medical appliances she uses; no standard of care is abridged unless a
defect is patent and readily observable.40 However, even if the nurse
operates a non-defective piece of equipment in the proper manner, she
can be negligent if she fails to warn the patient of any obvious dangers
arising from the equipment's operation, and he is thereby injured.41
A situation often arising from the improper use of equipment that
frequently leads to malpractice actions involves the use of hot water
and other warming devices designed to keep a patient's body tempera-
ture at a desired level.42 Commonly, the patient is burned either
because the water is too hot or because the warming device is not prop-
erly insulated. Unfortunately, most burns result when a patient is
unconscious, often causing serious injury.43 Courts are virtually unani-
mous in holding that neglect resulting in such injuries constitutes ac-
tionable negligence on the part of the nurse.44
Improper Exercise of Skills
The situation which most clearly resembles traditional medical
40. In Butler v. Northwestern Hosp., 202 Minn. 290, 278 N.W. 37 (1938), a de-
fective clamp on proctoclysis equipment allowed hot water to flow unrestricted into
plaintiff, severely burning his bowel, while the nurse was out of the room. The court
said:
[The nurse], although a trained professional, could reasonably rely upon the
hospital's furnishing a proper clamp. We agree with defendant that if the
article furnished was obviously unfit for the use for which it was furnished
and intended, and the nurse used it in violation of the usual standards of due
care of nursing practice, the defendant cannot be chargeable with any in-
jurious effects therefrom. But, the defect was not patent. The clamp was
furnished apparently ready for use and it was not her duty to examine into
its mechanical parts for the discovery of possible defects.
Id. at -, 278 N.W. at 39 (emphasis added). See also Ratliffe v. Wesley Hosp. &
Nurses' Training School, 135 Kan. 306, 10 P.2d 859 (1932).
41. Welsh v. Mercy Hosp., 65 Cal. App. 2d 473, 151 P.2d 17 (1944).
42. A-HEW, supra note 1, at 163.
43. A conscious patient will usually complain about the pain, thereby giving a nurse
the opportunity to correct the mistake before it reaches the level of injury which would
lead to a malpractice action.
44. See Ware v. Culp, 24 Cal. App. 2d 22, 74 P.2d 283 (1937); Corey v. Beck,
58 Idaho 281, 72 P.2d 856 (1937); Ratliffe v. Wesley Hosp. & Nurses' Training School,
135 Kan. 306, 10 P.2d 859 (1932); St. Paul-Mercury Indemnity Co. v. St. Joseph's
Hosp., 212 Minn. 1, 4 N.W.2d 637 (1942); Louzader v. James, 107 S.W.2d 976 (Mo.
App. 1937); Iacono v. New York Polyclinic Med. School & Hosp., 269 App. Div. 955,
58 N.Y.S.2d 244 (1945); Dillon v. Rockaway Beach Hosp. & Disp., 284 N.Y. 176,
30 N.E.2d 373 (1940); Aderhold v. Bishop, 94 Okla. 203, 221 P. 752 (1923); Miller v.
Mohr, 198 Wash. 619, 89 P.2d 807 (1939); Bise v. St. Luke's Hosp., 181 Wash. 269,
43 P.2d 4 (1935).
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malpractice arises where a nurse improperly exercises her actual nurs-
ing skills.45 One of the many skills a nurse must possess is proficiency
in the administration of hypodermic injections. Depending upon the
type of medication involved, an injection can be administered either
intermuscularly, intravenously, subcutaneously, or intradermerally. 40 If
the nurse improperly administers an injection, she can be liable for any
resulting injuries. The route48 to be used for an injection is normally
ordered by the doctor prescribing the medication; 49 if the nurse fails
to follow the proper route she is negligent. 0 Furthermore, negligence
results if the doctor does not specify a particular route because the drug
is one commonly administered and the nurse fails to follow the
preferred method.51
A nurse is charged with a duty to have a basic understanding of
the drugs she administers, including knowledge of their normal dos-
ages, routes, and possible side effects. In Norton v. Argonaut Insurance
Co.,52 a nurse administered a fatal dosage of medicine to an infant
through an injection. The dosage would not have been fatal if it had
been administered orally. Because the doctor did not specify the route,
the court concluded that the nurse was liable for the death:
A nurse who is unfamiliar with the fact that the drug in ques-
tion is prepared in oral form for administration to infants by
mouth is not properly and adequately trained for duty in a
pediatric ward. As laudable as her intentions are conceded
to have been on the occasion in question, her unfamiliarity
with the drug was a contributing factor in the child's death.
In this regard, we are of the opinion that she was negligent in
attempting to administer a drug with which she was not
familiar. While we concede that a nurse does not have the
same degree of knowledge regarding drugs as is possessed
by members of the medical profession, nevertheless, common
45. Actual nursing skills are those which a nurse is specifically trained to perform.
See generally KozmR & DuGAs, FUNDAMENTALS OF PATIENT CARE (1967) [hereinafter
cited as KozmR & DuGAs].
46. Id.
47. Bernardi v. Community Hosp. Ass'n, 166 Colo. 280, 443 P.2d 708 (1968).
48. In medical terminology, "route" refers to the method of administration of a
medication (e.g. orally, by injection, etc.). Interview, supra note 31.
49. Id.
50. Moore v. Guthrie Hosp., Inc., 403 F.2d 366 (4th Cir. 1968).
51. Often medicine is available in several forms, all of which are commonly admin-
istered. For example, in a nursing home, a doctor will frequently order 5 milligrams
of valium for a patient and not specify the route to be used. Whether the nurse chooses
an oral form, or an intramuscular or intraveneous injection, depends on how the pa-
tient's comfort and needs will best be served. Interview, supra note 31.
52. 144 So. 2d 249 (La. App. 1962).
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sense dictates that no nurse should attempt to administer
a drug under the circumstances shown in the case at bar.51
While Norton provides a graphic example of negligence, situations
where the nurse's actions are not so clearly negligent have also resulted
in potential liability for the nurse. This is illustrated by a situation fre-
quently presented to nurses-the necessity of moving patients. If, in
the exercise of her nursing judgment, the nurse decides a patient
should be moved and she moves him improperly, she is liable for any
resulting injuries. 54 She is also subject to liability if she asks a patient
to do some act which is potentially dangerous, because of side effects
from a recently administered drug, and injury results.5 5 This is true
even though the drug was administered by another nurse or doctor, as
long as she has knowledge of its administration.56 This knowledge may
be actual or constructive.
A medical chart is opened on each patient as he enters the hos-
pital. A record is kept of each completed medical procedure, including
all drugs administered during the patient's stay in the hospital, their
dosages, and the time and method of their administration. Each day
as she begins work, a nurse attends "report," a session in which she
is briefed on each of the patients she will care for in the ensuing eight
hours. At this time she also is allowed time to review the charts. 57 Be-
cause of this opportunity for review, the nurse is charged with construc-
tive knowledge of the charts' contents.58
Improper Medicine
When a nurse is working in conjunction with a doctor, he often
will order a specific medicine in a certain dosage. If the nurse fails
to provide the requested medicine in the prescribed dosage, she is
liable. If the doctor administers an improper injection which the nurse
has prepared, and he cannot reasonably discover the error, he is
53. Id. at 260. In addition, the court held the doctor liable for failing to prescribe
the preferred route of administration. See generally Annot., 63 A.L.R.3d 1020 (1975).
54. McElroy v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 163 F. Supp. 193 (W.D. Ark.
1958).
55. Thompson v. United States, 368 F. Supp. 466 (W.D. La. 1973).
56. Id.
57. Interview, supra note 31.
58. A nurse will also be liable if she abuses her discretion in some other fashion.
For example, if the attending physician leaves an order for a procedure to be adminis-
tered as needed, or as requested by the patient, and the nurse fails to administer the
procedure, she is liable for any injury that results. See Skidmore v. Oklahoma Hosp.,
137 Okla. 133, 278 P. 334 (1929).
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absolved of responsibility, leaving only the nurse liable for the negli-
gence.5 9
A nurse is given some discretion in the tools she can use for a
prescribed procedure. For example, in preparing a patient for surgery,
the nurse's duty is to clean and prepare the skin surface around the
point of surgical entry. She has a choice of which chemical agent she
uses to perform this function; if she chooses the wrong one and injury
results to the patient, she is liable.60 Because a nurse is not competent
to prescribe medicines, this general class of negligent acts is quite
narrow. Unfortunately, cases of this nature occur with alarming
regularity,6' making up a substantial share of the reported cases of
nurses' malpractice.
Improper Diagnosis
While a nurse has no duty to diagnose the cause of a patient's
discomfort,"2 she does have a duty to observe carefully and report all
relevant symptoms to the doctor.63 A heart attack victim provides a
classic example. While the symptoms are readily observable, the nurse
cannot diagnose the cause of those symptoms. She must, however,
recognize the seriousness of the symptoms and call a doctor.6 4 In cases
of non-serious symptoms, the nurse does not have to report them to
the doctor immediately, but she is required to record her observations
in the patient's chart, so that the doctor and other medical personnel
will have knowledge of them.65
59. Hallinan v. Prindle, 220 Cal. 46, 29 P.2d 202 (1934).
60. Emerson v. Chapman, 138 Okla. 180, 280 P. 820 (1929).
61. See NunsING, April, 1976, at 103-06.
62. A nurse is prohibited from making a diagnosis on the theory that such consti-
tutes the unauthorized practice of medicine. H. SARNER, THE NURSE AND THE LAw
48-53 (1968) [hereinafter cited as SARNFR].
63. In Hansch v. Hackett, 190 Wash. 97, 66 P.2d 1129 (1937), the court, finding
a physician not guilty of negligence, stated:
There was therefore a wide open opportunity for the jury to find that Dr.
Hackett was not negligent, but that (1) the nurse who received Mrs. Hansch
at the hospital was negligent in not discovering the symptoms of eclampsia
contravis and recording them on the hospital chart so that Dr. Hackett, when
he read the chart at 8:30 a.m., might have ordered the proper and necessary
treatment. In passing, it may be said that, as described, the symptoms are
such as should be observed by a nurse even though she might not have known
what was indicated thereby.
Id. at -, 66 P.2d at 1131. This decision, in effect, raises the custom of charting a
patient's condition from mere convenience for doctors and hospital staff, to a legal obli-
gation of the nurse to the patient.
64. Baur v. Mesta Machine Co., 405 Pa. 617, 176 A.2d 684 (1961).
65. 190 Wash. at-, 66 P.2d at 1131.
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Following Doctor's Orders
A nurse is granted some protection from malpractice liability if
the injury to the patient results from her attempts to carry out the orders
of the attending physician. The rationale of the protection is that
"[n]urses are not supposed to be experts in the technique of diagnosis
or the mechanics of treatment." 66  In stating this rule, the court in
Habuda v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, Inc.,617 held that nurses are
required to use their best efforts to follow the orders of the physician
unless obvious injury to the patient would result. Thus, in the absence
of an obvious resulting injury, a nurse will be completely shielded from
liability by following the doctor's orders. The court in Byrd v. Marion
General Hospital68 defined the rule more graphically:
The great weight of authority . .. establishes the prin-
ciple that nurses, in the discharge of their duties, must obey
and diligently execute the orders of the physician or surgeon
in charge of the patient, unless, of course, such order was so
obviously negligent as to lead any reasonable person to antici-
pate that substantial injury would result to the patient from
the execution of such order or performance of such direction.
Certainly, if a physician or surgeon should order a nurse to
stick fire to a patient, no nurse would be protected from lia-
bility for damages for undertaking to carry out the orders of
the physician.69
This broad protection is tempered by the nurse's obligation to
follow her best professional judgment. In today's world of specialized
medicine, where nurses are becoming very sophisticated and highly
trained in their various areas of expertise, it is possible that a doctor
might give an order to a nurse who, because of her degree of familiar-
ity with the area, would recognize it as an error, or at least an
abnormal procedure. Because of this increased knowledge, it is
probable that in future cases nurses will be held to a stricter standard
of care in discerning the correctness of a doctor's orders. In their train-
ing today, student nurses are told to question any order they do not
understand or agree with, on the theory that doctors sometimes make
mistakes. 70 If the doctor explains his decision and the nurse still does
66. 163 F. Supp. at 198.
67. 3 N.C. App. 11, 164 S.E.2d 17 (1968).
68. 202 N.C. 337, 162 S.E. 738 (1932).
69. Id. at--, 162 S.E.at 740 (emphasis added).
70. Interview, supra note 31.
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not agree with it, she is instructed to tell the physician to perform the
procedure himself.71
In view of training programs and the reasonably prudent nurse
standard of care, it appears that a nurse is liable for following any order
of a doctor which she, because of her training and experience,
knows or should know to be erroneous. Otherwise, under a literal
reading of the "stick fire to the patient" rule, nurses would be exempt
from careless behavior as long as the nurse's action was directed by a
physician. The rule would impose liability on a nurse only where
knowledge that injury would result if the order was followed would be
obvious to any reasonable person.7 2  Even though, because of her
special training, she knew injury would result, a nurse could be exempt
from liability under this concept merely because no layman would con-
sider the result obvious. Thus, "obvious injury" must be defined from
the standpoint of a similarly situated nurse rather than the "any reason-
able person" standard of Byrd.
While a nurse has a positive duty to treat her patients with the
reasonable level of skill which a nurse in her situation in her general
community would use, this duty can be breached in a variety of ways.
While some of the more common examples have been pointed out, this
compilation is not all inclusive. As in other areas dealing with complex
human behavior, new kinds of breaches arise with expected fre-
quency.73
71. Id. In Norton, the nurse who administered the fatal dose of lanoxin did inquire
of several staff doctors as to the preferred route. Following accepted medical procedure,
they told her to consult the doctor who had prescribed the dosage. She failed to do
so, however, before administering the medication. 144 So. 2d at 255, 257.
72. See note 69 supra and accompanying text.
73. For example, in Hendrickson v. Hodkin, 276 N.Y. 252, 11 N.E.2d 899 (1937),
a known layman applied an arsenic compound (which was known to be caustic, if not
fatal) to a sore on the plaintiff's lip, in the presence of a doctor, a nurse, and the
superintendent of the hospital. In reversing a lower court judgment, the court said the
basis for the hospital's liability lay in the fact that the superintendent committed a crime
by knowingly allowing a layman to treat the plaintiff while a patient in the hospital.
The court noted with approval Judge Lazansky's dissenting opinion to the trial court's
opinion:
Nurses are not expected to advise the administration if they are of the opinion
that a doctor is not using the proper methods, for they are under the super-
vision of the doctors. But here, they observed that it was not a doctor who
was treating the patient .... This was a concern of administration, and not
of medical care.
Hendrickson v. Hodkin, 294 N.Y.S. 982, 985 (1937). The inference can reasonably
be drawn that had the nurse, but not the superintendent, been aware that treatment
was being rendered by a layman, she could have been held liable.
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CAUSATION
Once the plaintiff in a malpractice action against a nurse estab-
lishes the duty and standard of care required in the situation and
demonstrates the nurse's breach of that duty, he must then prove that
the activity complained of was the proximate cause of his injury. Proxi-
mate causation is the means by which courts limit liability for the negli-
gent act.71 In a nurse's malpractice action, as in situations of general
negligence law, if the injury can be said to have been proximately
caused by the nurse's negligent actions, then the nurse is liable for the
injurious results.
After the plaintiff establishes proximate causation, he still must
prove that he has suffered an injury which is compensable in damages;
either actual damages (such as additional medical treatment to correct
the result of the negligent medical procedure), or special damages
(such as pain and suffering). In this area of causation and damages,
a nurse's malpractice suit radically departs from common negligence
lawsuits and is more analogous to traditional malpractice proceedings
against a doctor. The principal distinction between malpractice actions
and other liability claims is the need for expert testimony in malpractice
cases to establish that the injury was proximately caused by the alleged
negligent act.75 Generally, expert testimony is needed in malpractice
cases because of the difficulties implicit in trying to establish that a par-
ticular injury resulted from the alleged negligent act. Ordinarily, in
the absence of expert testimony, a layman is unable to understand the
connection between the act and the injury, because of the complexities
involved in medical treatment and diagnosis.76
While expert testimony is generally required to establish the injury
and causation, the plaintiff's burden can be eased in some situations
74. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF rn LAW OF TORTS, § 42, 244 (4th ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
75. 2 Wash. App. at -, 469 P.2d at 232.
76. "A bad result is not in itself evidence of negligence . . . ." Id. In most cases,
in order to understand the relationship between the "bad result" and the alleged negligent
act, the layman will require a non-technical explanation of the causal link. For exam-
ple, in situations where the nurse has made a blatent error, the average layman would
have no difficulty in seeing that the nurse was negligent. See Emerson v. Chapman,
138 Okla. 180, 280 P. 820 (1929) (where the nurse used a caustic solution to prepare
the patient for an operation); see also Hallinan v. Prindle, 220 Cal. 46, 29 P.2d 202
(1934) (where the nurse substituted formalin for novocain). In Emerson, the normaljuror would expect a caustic solution to burn the patient; therefore, the cause of the
burn would be relatively easy to establish. In Hallinan, however, the average layman
would have no idea whether or not an injection of formalin rather than novocain would
cause grievous injury to the patient. This demonstrates the obvious need for expert
testimony and the reason why it is usually required in malpractice cases.
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through the use of legal presumptions. One readily identifiable act
automatically shifts the burden of going forward with the evidence to
the defendant hospital: proof that a foreign object was left in the
patient following surgery. All the plaintiff must show is that the object
was left in him; the burden then shifts to the defendant to show that the
negligence caused no damage, or that the inclusion was either intended
or a normal practice in that particular type of operation. 77 This is a
typical example of the application of the presumption of negligence
doctrine, or negligence per se.18
The other major presumption of negligence which can benefit the
plaintiff in a medical malpractice action is the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur. In order to benefit from this presumption, the plaintiff must
show that the injury complained of occurred through someone's negli-
gence, and that the instrumentality of that negligence was under the
exclusive control of the defendant. 79  While this is an obviously useful
presumption for the plaintiff, it should be noted that he may still have
to establish, through expert testimony, that his injury was not the result
of natural forces, but was caused instead by someone's negligence.80
Inherent is the need to establish the relative standard of care applicable
to his case, whether for the doctor, the hospital, the nurse, or all three.
Through application of the doctrine, the plaintiff is relieved of the bur-
den of proving exactly who the negligent party is and the specific act
or omission causing the injury.'
POTENTIAL MALPRACTICE DEFENDANTS
While a negligent nurse is individually liable if the necessary ele-
ments of a malpractice action are proved against her, many nurses have
insufficient financial resources to compensate an injured plaintiff.8 2 As
77. See Buzan v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 203 So. 2d 11 (Fla. App. 1967); Grant v.
Touro Infirmary, 254 La. 204, 223 So. 2d 148 (1969); Martin v. Perth Amboy Gen'l
Hosp., 104 N.J. Super. 335, 250 A.2d 40 (App. Div. 1969); Harle v. Krchnak, 422
S.W.2d 810 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
78. PROSSER, supra note 74, indicates that the doctrine of negligence per se is uti-
lized when a statute has been violated; however, courts apply the term more loosely
in malpractice cases. See cases cited in note 77 supra.
79. Ybarra v. Spangard, 208 P.2d 445 (Cal. 1949). See generally Wmza, Tim
NURsE's GuIDE TO ThE LAW 118-20 (1970) [hereinafter cited as WILGIp].
80. Id. See also Stone v. Sisters of Charity of House of Providence, 2 Wash. App.
607, 469 P.2d 229 (1970); Homer v. Northern Pac. Beneficial Ass'n Hosp., Inc., 62
Wash. 2d 351, 382 P.2d 518 (1963). See generally Annot., 9 A.L.R.3d 1315 (1966);
PROSSER, supra note 74, at 214.
81. 208 P.2d at 445.
82. In 1973, the median income for physicians was $49,415, up from $37,620 in
1968 and $22,100 in 1959. DEP'T OF HEW, S.S. ADM. OFFICE OF RESEARCH & STATIS-
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a result, a plaintiff must carefully analyze the negligent act to determine
if, based on the nurse's act causing the injury, others besides the nurse
are subject to liability. Determining who, aside from the nurse herself,
is liable for the nurse's negligent actions is frequently complicated by
the fact that, in the performance of her duties, a nurse may be respon-
sible to the doctor,88 the hospital, 84 neither or both. This complex rela-
tionship is compelled by the very nature of the nursing profession; the
task of ministering to the needs of the ill often calls for the simultane-
ous performance of acts ordered by different supervisors.85
Assuming the negligent nurse is employed by a hospital, it is likely
that the hospital will be joined as a defendant in any action against
her. 6 Through application of agency principles, an entity employing
a nurse is liable for her negligence resulting from activities performed
within the scope of her employment.s7  Thus, a non-negligent super-
visor or employer may be liable under the doctrine of respondeat
superior.8 s This rule becomes more complex as it relates to nurses who
perform numerous different tasks, because of the concept of the
"borrowed employee." This corollary was carefully delineated and its
application explained in Dickerson v. American Sugar Refining Com-
pany:89
Tics, MEDICAL CARE-ExPENDrruREs, Puicas AND Cosrs: BACcRoUND BooK, DHEW
PUB. No. (SSA) 75-11909, Sept. 1975, at 59. On the other hand, the average starting
salary for nurses in 1972 was $8,200, up from $6,400 in 1968. AMERICAN Nuusns'
ASS'N, STATISTCS DEP'T, Survey of Salary Ranges for R.N. Staff-Level Positions in Non-
federal Short-Term General Hospitals, December 1971-January 1972, at 2. The average
individual net worth of nurses interviewed (see Interview, supra note 31), was $10,500.
This figure does not include assets held solely by their spouses, or accumulated by virtue
of their spouses' earnings.
83. When a nurse performs a task under a physician's direct supervision, she is
responsible to him.
84. For example, when a nurse performs a strictly administrative task, as part of
her employment duties with the hospital, she is directly answerable to the hospital for
her actions.
85. A common example is the performance of certain routine procedures by nurses,
such as caring for patient hygiene. If requested by a physician to perform such services,
the nurse may be considered as performing at his bidding and under his supervision.
However, the task could also be considered to be a routine part of patient care and
administrative in nature. If so, this puts the hospital, as employer, in the position of
supervisor.
86. In some cases, such as with specialized private nurse-practitioners, this is impos-
sible, since the nurse's only employer is the patient. There is, of course, nurses' malprac-
tice insurance to cover this particular professional hazard.
87. See generally Annot., 29 A.L.R.3d 1065 (1970).
88. Stone v. Sisters of Charity of House of Providence, 2 Wash. App. 607, 469
P.2d 229 (1970). See also 368 F. Supp. at 755.
89. 211 F.2d 200 (3rd Cir. 1953).
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We begin with the fundamental proposition that one sought
to be held is liable only if he is the master of him who was
negligent. One who is in the general employ of A may, as
to certain work, be transferred to the services of B so that he
becomes B's servant while engaged in that work. In order
to determine whether a person is the employee of A or B,
the test is whether the one or the other had the right to con-
trol, not only the work to be done, but also the manner of
doing it, and the person is the servant of him who had the
right to control the manner of performance of the work, re-
gardless of whether or not he actually exercises that right.
Then, of course, there is a middle ground. That is, a person
may be the servant of two masters, not joint employers, at
the same time as to the same act, provided that service to one
does not involve an abandonment of service to the other. 0
The "borrowed employee" corollary is further complicated by the
doctrine of charitable immunity. Simply stated, the doctrine provides
that a charitable entity is immune from tort liability through operation
of law.9' If this rule is followed, a plaintiff employing respondeat
superior in a suit against a nurse may find the principal is a nonprofit
charitable hospital immune from liability for its negligent employees'
acts.
In most jurisdictions, the doctrine of charitable immunity is a judi-
cially-created rule, developed on the theory that if a charitable
institution is liable for the tortious acts of its agents, the corpus of the
trusts set up to finance the institution would be dissipated through dam-
age suits, forcing the institution to close.92 This possibility is felt to
be cumulatively more harmful to society than any individual hardship
suffered by an injured party through denial of damages for his negli-
gence claim. One major exception to the doctrine has, however,
accorded plaintiffs some relief; if a charitable institution has liability
insurance coverage, the insurance carrier cannot use the defense of
charitable immunity to avoid payment on the policy. 8 Insurance car-
riers have somewhat negated this relief by writing policies that specifi-
cally exclude coverage for malpractice by the insured institution's
employees.9 4
90. Id. at 202-03. See generally WuLm, supra note 79, at 39-42, 58.
91. See generally PROSSER, supra note 74, at 992-96.
92. Id.
93. See Hemenway v. Presbyterian Hosp. Ass'n, 161 Colo. 42, 419 P.2d 312
(1966); O'Connor v. Boulder Colo. Sanitarium Ass'n, 105 Colo. 259, 96 P.2d 835
(1939); Brown v. St. Lukes Hosp. Ass'n, 85 Colo. 167, 274 P. 740 (1929); St. Mary's
Academy of Sisters of Loretto v. Solomon, 77 Colo. 463, 238 P. 22 (1925); Grant
v. Touro Infirmary, 254 La. 204, 223 So. 2d 148 (1969).
94. See Grant v. Touro Infirmary, 254 La. 204, 223 So. 2d 148 (1969).
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Other exceptions have been carved out of the broad protection
of charitable immunity. In Grant v. Touro Infirmary,95 a Louisiana
court upheld the doctrine, but noted with approval two additional
exceptions to charitable immunity in negligence actions: first, that the
doctrine applies only to beneficiaries of the charity (including paying
patients) and, secondly, that it does not apply when direct corporate
negligence can be shown (such as where the hospital is negligent in
hiring the individual nurse).96
A number of illogical legal fictions developed concurrently with
the immunity doctrine. For example, the court in Schloendorff v. Soci-
ety of New York Hospital,7 stated that nurses treating patients are car-
rying out the orders of physicians, to whose authority they are subject,
and that during such an undertaking they are not servants of the hos-
pital.18 This statement was later expanded to the point that the hos-
pital was liable only if the negligent act was administrative or clerical
in nature.
By 1939, this immunity was extended to cover all hospitals,
whether private or charitable.9 9 At that point, the question to be
resolved in malpractice cases was simply whether or not the act by the
nurse was "medical" in nature. If so, the hospital, whether charitable
or not, was not liable. The extent courts went to in their efforts to
distinguish "medical" acts from "administrative" acts is well illustrated
in Bing v. Thunig,100 which overruled parts of Schloendorff.10 1
Bing noted that acts such as placing improperly capped hot water
bottles on a patient, giving a transfusion to the wrong patient, using an
improperly sterilized needle for an injection, and failing to place side-
boards on a bed when they were necessary had been held to be admin-
istrative acts. On the other hand, keeping a hot water bottle on a pa-
tient too long, giving the wrong type of blood to a patient, improperly
95. 254 La. 204, 223 So. 2d 148 (1969).
96. See Hallinan v. Prindle, 17 Cal. App. 2d 656, 62 P.2d 1075 (1936); Shane
v. Hospital of the Good Samaritan, 2 Cal. App. 2d 334, 37 P.2d 1066 (1934); Hender-
son v. Twin Falls Co., 59 Idaho 97, 80 P.2d 801 (1938); Ratliffe v. Wesley Hosp. &
Nurses' Training School, 135 Kan. 306, 10 P.2d 859 (1932); Norton v. Argonaut Ins.
Co., 144 So. 2d 249 (La. App. 1962); Miller v. Mohr, 198 Wash. 619, 89 P.2d 807
(1939); Bise v. St. Luke's Hosp., 181 Wash. 269, 43 P.2d 4 (1935).
97. 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
98. Id. at -, 105 N.E. at 94.
99. Steinert v. Brunswick Home, 172 Misc. 787, 16 N.Y.S.2d 83 (Sup. Ct. 1939),
aff'd, 20 N.Y.S.2d 459 (App. Div. 1940).
100. 2 N.Y.2d 656, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3, 143 N.E.2d 3 (1957).
101. While the court in Bing did not claim to overrule Schloendorff, it is accurate
to say it overruled that portion of the Schloendorff holding discussed in this comment.
19761
20
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 12 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol12/iss1/3
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
administering an injection, and failing to decide that sideboards were
necessary had been held to be "medical."' °  This illustrates the arbi-
trary decisions courts were making in applying this doctrine.
Fortunately for the injured plaintiff, the concept of charitable
immunity is rapidly disappearing.10 3 In most jurisdictions the courts
have struck down the doctrine; however, some states have limited the
charitable immunity exemption through legislation. 10 4  With the doc-
trine rapidly fading into disuse, the rule of respondeat superior, pre-
viously applicable only to private hospitals, will be applied to charitable
institutions as well. Therefore, the issue of concern for courts today
is who has control over the nurse's acts.10
The general method for determining if a physician is liable for a
nurse's negligence was stated in Burns v. Owens. 00 Burns notes that
generally a doctor is not liable for the negligence of hospital nurses
unless they are performing under his direct supervision and control, or
unless he is independently negligent for allowing them to attend the
patient. A physician may not be charged with liability if he gives a
nurse proper instructions which she fails to carry out, resulting in injury
to the patient.10 7
IMPLICATIONS OF INSURANCE
An additional non-legal factor gaining increasing significance in
the area of nurses' malpractice is nurses' malpractice liability insurance.
In contrast to insurance rates paid by physicians, malpractice insurance
102. 2 N.Y.2d at 657-58, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 4-5, 143 N.E.2d at 4-5.
103. See Moore v. Guthrie Hosp., Inc., 403 F.2d 366 (4th Cir. 1968); Bernardi v.
Community Hosp. Ass'n, 166 Colo. 280, 443 P.2d 708 (1968); Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d
656, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3, 143 N.E.2d 3 (1957).
104. See, e.g., Martin v. Perth Amboy Gen'l Hosp., 104 N.J. Super. 335, 250 A.2d
40 (App. Div. 1969), where the New Jersey Charitable Immunity statute, N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:53A-8, which limits a charitable organization's liability to $10,000, was ap-
plied to set the negligent nurses' liability. Out of a total award to the patient of $36,000,
the jury required the surgeon to pay $18,000. The court said the hospital's share was
its statutory limit, and assessed the nurses the remainder of the judgment.
105. States are split as to the kind of control necessary over a nurse's activities. Some
states employ a "Captain of the Ship" philosophy to operations, holding that the surgeon
in charge has complete control. See, e.g., Aderhold v. Bishop, 94 Okla. 203, 221 P.
752 (1923); Harle v. Krchnak, 422 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967); WILUG, supra
note 79, at 59. Other states look to the specific activity involved to see who has control.
See, e.g., Buzan v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 203 So. 2d 11 (Fla. App. 1967); Emerson v.
Chapman, 138 Okla. 180, 280 P. 820 (1929); Annot., 29 A.L.R.3d 1065 (1970); WIL-
LIe, supra note 79, at 59.
106. 459 S.W.2d 303 (Mo. 1970).
107. Id. at 305.
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is readily available to nurses at nominal rates.10 8 Traditionally, how-
ever, nurses have not been inclined to insure themselves against mal-
practice exposure.10 9 In light of several factors gaining increased
importance today, however, nurses' malpractice insurance coverage
should show rapid gains in the future.
First of all, professional nurses are beginning to realize that while
most plaintiffs join the employer hospital in any negligence action
against a nurse, the doctrine of respondeat superior does not cut off
the nurse's liability. The negligent nurse not only can be required to
compensate the plaintiff for his injuries, but also to indemnify her
employer for payments made to the plaintiff because of the negli-
gence." Because of the possible conflict of legal interests between
them, a nurse sued along with her employer may be forced to hire her
own attorney, at her own expense. Secondly, wide coverage by the
national press of medical malpractice and the cost of malpractice insur-
ance is making health care professionals keenly aware of the personal
financial devastation which can result from an adverse malpractice
judgment."' Finally, professional nursing organizations, realizing the
need for malpractice insurance, are making determined efforts to
encourage their members to purchase this protection."2 As more
nurses become aware of the increasing necessity for carrying malprac-
tice insurance and the availability of inexpensive coverage, it is likely
they will take advantage of it.
Because of the methods utilized in modern medicine, doctors do
not function in a vacuum, but rely heavily on nurses to carry out their
108. According to a 1973 government study, registered nurses and licensed practical
nurses could obtain $200,000/$600,000 (limit per occurrence/limitation on all occur-
rences for a calendar year) limit coverage for an annual premium of $10.95. The same
coverage was available to the "high-risk" specialty of Nurse Anesthetists for $43.80.
See A-HEW, supra note 1, at 650. The comparable coverage for doctors averaged
$2,307.40, id. at 540, with individual costs ranging widely, depending upon locale and
specialty. Id. at 494-601.
109. One Tulsa hospital has indicated that its malpractice policy covers its nurses;
therefore, it advises its employees they do not need separate individual coverage. Inter-
view with Mrs. R. J. Honeyman, Ass't Dir. of Nursing Service, St. Francis Hospital,
Tulsa, Oklahoma, October 23, 1975. Another Tulsa hospital has no such coverage, but
makes no strong recommendations as to the acquisition of individual coverage. Inter-
view, supra note 31.
110. A-HEW, supra note 1, at 649.
111. During the period September 1971 to August 1972, more than 1600 news items
pertaining directly to malpractice were published in the United States. A-HEW, supra
note 1, at 654.
112. See, e.g., 75 AMERICAN JouRNAL OF NulsinG 1420 (1975). The advertised plan
indicates a 1975 increase in the premium for 100/300 coverage to $15.00 annually.
"The policy covers legal defense costs, and nurses receive compensation of $50.00 a
day for time lost from work." Id.
1976]
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orders, observe patients' reactions, and monitor patients' conditions.
Widespread malpractice coverage by health care professionals may
encourage more malpractice suits against physicians, hospitals and
nurses. Coupled with the continuing trend of impersonal medical treat-
ment,113 not only will there possibly be an increase in the number of
malpractice actions brought against nurses, but the size of the average
settlement may increase as well." 4  While this bodes well for the suc-
cessful litigant, it means insurance premiums will be increased at all lev-
els."x5 This results in higher costs of rendering medical treatment
which will be passed on to everyone seeking medical care.116
STATUTORY COMPLICATIONS
Aside from the insurance aspects, the area of nurses' malpractice
is further complicated by various statutory provisions. Every state, pur-
suant to its police power, regulates the nursing profession operating
within its borders; 17 however, in most states, regulation consists solely
of licensing. The usual practice is to establish a board or commission
to oversee the practice of nursing," 38 including such functions as prepar-
ing, administering and grading licensing examinations; promulgating
regulations concerning the tasks nurses may perform; supervising
license renewals; and conducting investigations and proceedings in
connection with disciplining nurses for dereliction of their professional
duties."19
The grounds supporting a finding that a nurse's license should be
113. A government survey of consumer attitudes indicates that 36.1% of the con-
sumers surveyed felt doctors were more impersonal than they had been twenty years
ago. A-HEW, supra note 1, at 668.
114. In the medical malpractice claims closed by insurance companies in 1970, the
median payment to a plaintiff was $2,000. While there is no definite information avail-
able, the trend seems to be toward higher settlements. REPORT oF Tun SECRETARY'S
COMMISSION ON Marc~A MALPAcrxcF, DHEW Pun. No. (OS) 73-88, p.11 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as HEW].
115. Because of the complications arising from respondeat superior, the vast majority
of malpractice actions brought against nurses also name doctors and hospitals. Thus,
it can be presumed that an increase in the number of cases against nurses will also
mean an increase in malpractice suits against doctors and hospitals. Increased litigation
will lead to an increase in insurance premiums, the cost of which will be passed on
to the patient. A-HEW, supra note 1, at 552.
116. In 1970, the average physician treated 3,396 patients. Of the 206 million pa-
tients treated in the United States in 1970, only 14,500 malpractice claims were filed.
HEW, supra note 114, at 5-6.
117. See SARNFi, supra note 62, at 15.
118. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, § 567.4 (1971).
119. Id. at §§ 567.5-567.8.
[Vol. 12:104
23
Menges: The Negligent Nurse: Rx for the Medical Malpractice Victim
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2013
NURSES' MALPRACTICE
denied, revoked, or suspended are statutory.120 The majority of states
permit the board to penalize a nurse if she is "unfit or incompetent
by reason of negligent habits.' 21  While this seems to imply a further
malpractice sanction, most courts construe this type sanction as calling
for gross negligence.122  In any event, licenses are rarely revoked for
this reason. 23
In addition to the licensing standards, most states have passed
"Good Samaritan" laws, even though few malpractice cases arise from
the rendering of emergency treatment by doctors and nurses.12 4  These
laws are designed to protect the medical practitioner from liability arising
from emergency first aid treatment, except for acts of gross negli-
gence. 25  In many states, this protection has been extended to
nurses.
1 6
Some states include nurses under their medical malpractice stat-
utes, passed in the face of the doctors' malpractice crisis.127  These
statutes range from guaranteeing the availability of malpractice insur-
ance'2 8 to the establishment of special boards to hear malpractice cases
in the first instance and make findings of fact which may be introduced
at a later trial. 29
There is some question, however, as to whether all such medical
malpractice statutes apply to nurses. In the licensing statutes, clear dis-
tinctions have been made between registered nurses, licensed practical
nurses, and the various types of attendant positions or nurses' aids.'
Courts, on the other hand, usually do not bother to make distinctions
between RNs, LPNs and other attendants, lumping them together
under the broad category of "nurse."' 3' The question of statutory ap-
plicability to nurses is further complicated by judicial construction of
120. Id. at § 567.8.
121. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. § 65-1120(a) (3) (Supp. 1975). See generally, Annot.,
55 A.L.R.3d 1141 (1974).
122. See SARNER, supra note 62, at 27. See generally Annot., 55 A.L.R.3d 1141
(1974). See also Onz.A. STAT. tit. 59, § 567.8(a) (3) (1971).
123. SARNER, supra note 62, at 27.
124. HEW, supra note 114, at 15.
125. See Note, Good Samaritans and Liability for Medical Malpractice, 64 COLUM.
L.R. 1301 (1964); WzmLG, supra note 79, at 126-27; SA-RNFR, supra note 62, at 86.
126. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, § 518 (1971).
127. See, e.g., Ky. Rn v. STAT. H9 304.40-010-330 (Supp. 1976); IA. Rnv. STAT. ANN.
H9 40:1299.41-.47 (Supp. 1975).
128. See, e.g., IowA CODE ANN. § 519A.1 (Supp. 1975).
129. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 231, § 60B (Supp. 1976).
130. See, e.g., ORmA. STAT. tit. 59, H9 567.5-.6 (1971).
131. See generally Annot., 51 A.L.R.2d 970 (1957).
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special statutes of limitation for "medical malpractice." New York and
Ohio have both decided that such statutes do not apply to nurses.1 82
Hawaii and Utah, on the other hand, specifically include nurses in their
statutes of limitation for medical malpractice.' 83
CONCLUSION
Malpractice has become a fact of life for doctors, hospitals and
patients alike. On the other hand, while malpractice has always been
of concern for nurses in a few isolated instances, the malpractice prob-
lem is just looming on the horizon for the nursing profession as a whole.
Fear of potential liability will lead to increased insurance coverage
which, in turn, will lead to increased malpractice claims against nurses,
creating a vicious cycle similar to that which currently embroils doctors
in the "malpractice crisis." It is possible, of course, that the process
will be slowed, or the chain broken, by legislative action; existing stat-
utes, however, are too new, and nurses' malpractice cases too few, to
make any firm predictions.
William C. Menges, Jr.
132. Wolff v. Jamaica Hosp., 11 App. Div. 2d 801, 205 N.Y.S.2d 152 (1960); Isen-
stein v. Malcomson, 227 App. Div. 66, 236 N.Y.S. 641 (1929); Richardson v. Doe,
176 Ohio St. 370, 199 N.E.2d 878 (1964); Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 1336 (1966).
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